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PERPETUITIES UNDER THE NEW
AMENDMENT*
JOHN KEHOE

W

ITH the adoption of the amendment to the statute 230.14 governing perpetuities in Wisconsin, there has arisen a flood of conjecture as to what may be the effect of this measure upon the creation
of future estates in personalty hereafter or its effect upon executory
devises already created but not as yet in operation. The judicial interpretation of this statute is to be expected in the near future and this
decision is awaited with considerable expectancy as it involves an
issue of tremendous importance toward the disposition of much of the
accumulated wealth of individuals in the state. Heretofore the law
has permitted the tying up of real property for any number of lives
so long as the instrument creating the estate provided the trustee with
power to sell or convert. Estates in personalty could be tied up indefinitely. It may not be out of place before delving into an exposition of this law, to say a few words as to the merits of this measure
making personal property subject to the same restrictions as real
property.
Comparatively speaking, Wisconsin is still in its infancy in regard
to the building up of industry and the centralization of capital. Ordinary foresight will be sufficient to estimate the effect of the rapidly
increasing tendency to create future estates, taking vast properties out
of the paths of commerce, tying them up in trust companies for
decades to come, thereby stifling all initiative and checking the throbbing ambition of young blood which might often have infused new life
into a dying enterprise. Take as an example the concentrated wealth
of the insurance companies alone. It has already become a matter
of grave concern to the officials of these companies to find sufficient
securities of proper qualifications to meet the ever growing and already enormous surplus which is rapidly piling up. In addition to
this if we consider the possibility of the great fortunes of the state or
nation being tied up in trust companies which are restricted in their
investment to securities of proven worth, from whence could new
enterprises expect financial backing? In a financial center, such as
New York, the grave consequences of such a situation can readily
be estimated and the condition the resources of the country would be
in if this tendency went unchecked by timely restriction. The inherent
desire to accumulate and control one's fortune and to exert and extend
that control as far into the future as possible is perhaps natural and
legitimate. But when we consider the governmental protection which
* Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of requirements for degree of Juris
Doctor.
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made possible the accumulation of this wealth and that this same
wealth is now allowed to clog the wheels of progress or stifle the
expansion of ambitious generations, we can more readily understand
the wisdom and necessity of placing some restraint upon a tendency
that cannot fail to bring alarming if not disastrous results to our
industrial welfare.
The tendency to exert control over property has been a dominating
force, yet perhaps a human and natural desire, which we find manifesting itself in the history of English property after the Norman
Conquest. The pride of possession engendered a desire to direct the
destiny of that property through generations to come. So not content to exert this control during life, owners of wordly goods irnsisted
on devising means whereby this control could be exerted even after
their departure from this life. "Te teneam moriens" (dying I will
keep you), is the expiring lord's apostrophe to his manor, for which
he is forging these fetters that seem, by restricting the dominion of
others, to extend his own. (Jarmain)
The Statute De Donis is a conspicuous illustration of the force of
that tendency manifesting itself in early legislation. The Statute
De Donis (1285), as a restriction upon the alienation of fee tail
estates, remained in force for three hundred years, which of itself
explains the tenacious persistence with which the landed classes sought
to keep property within the lines of blood descendants.
The evils or objectionable characters of these future estates were
felt by the early judges and resulted in a judicial invention to evade
the statute in the form of a conveyance known as the fine and common recovery. This permitted the owner of an estate tail to pass
a title in fee barring the entail. Taltarum's Case, Y.B. 12 Edw. IV,
19. Contingent remainders, therefore, being destructible at common
law by the owner of the prior estate, the need for future restriction
was not felt for some time. To this may be ascribed the fact that
the law of perpetuities is of camparitively modern origin, not having
come into a crystallized form until 182o. But when the Statute of
Uses (535)

and the Statute of Wills (1540)

came into existence,

making possible the creation of future estates at variance with all
the rules of common law, the struggle was renewed between courts and
parliament.
In the celebrated case of Pells v. Brown 1620 (Cro. Jac. 590), the
rule was first promulgated that executory devises were indestructible.
In that case, the testator being siesed of lands in fee, devised said
lands to his son Thomas with the provision that if Thomas died without
issue living, then his brother William should have the lands, his heirs
and assigns forever. Upon the death of the testator Thomas entered
and suffered a common recovery to the use of himself and his heirs.
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The question was whether the devisee of Thomas had a good title as
against William. The court held that Thomas took the estate in fee
subject to the limitation over to William, and that although this was
a limitation of a fee upon a fee, and although William had only a
possibility of a fee, effective upon the happening of the event which
was to control the limitation over, nevertheless the common recovery
did not bar William. Counsel for the devisee of Thomas argued
that the recovery should bar William because otherwise "it would be
a mischievous kind of perpetuity." But the court ruled that if the
recovery were allowed it might frustrate all devises and that there
was no "mischievous perpetuity" because "the person who had the
contingency could join in the recovery thus passing complete title."
This decision opened up an avenue for the creation of estates upon
executory devises with the possibility of tying up property indefinitely.
The courts realized the dangers incumbent upon the lack of some kind
of restraint upon the propensity for perpetuating these estates, but
they were slow to form a rule. A hazy conception of a rule against
perpetuities was enunciated by Baron Tanfield in the case of Child v.
Baylie but it was not until the celebrated case of Duke of Norfolk
(1682) that the rule against perpetuities assumed a concrete and
determinate form. Here we find the definition of a perpetuity laid
down by that "father of equity," Lord Chancellor Nottingham, as
follows: "A perpetuity is the settlement of an estate or an interest
in tail, with such remainders expectant upon it, as are in no sort in
the power of the tenant in tail, in possession, to dock by any recovery
or assignment, but such remainders must continue as perpetual clogs
upon the estate; such do fight against God, for they pretend to such a
stability in human affairs as the nature of them admits not of, and
they are against the reason and the policy of the law, and therefore
not to be endured." Later on, in speaking of what should be a
suitable limitation to impose upon future estates, the same jurist
remarked: "I will tell you where I will stop; I will stop wherever
any visible inconvenience doth appear; for the just bounds of a fee
upon a fee are not yet determined, but the first inconvenience that
ariseth upon it will regulate it." The Duke of Norfolk's Case held
that a contingent future limitation which must necessarily vest within
a period of lives in being, was good. "The candles were all burning
at once," so the estate would merely be tied up during the life of the
longest liver. Fifteen years later, the House of Lords hearing the
case of Lloyl v. Carew (Shaw P.C. 137) decided that the addition
of twelve months to a period of lives in being "was not too remote."
In the celebrated case of Thellusson v. Woodford it was held that be
the lives ever so numerous, so long as they were in being and capable
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of being ascertained the vesting of a conditional limitation might be
postponed until the termination of the life of the longest liver.
Thus as the cases arose, the rule was gradually built up and the
period of time was extended from lives in being (Duke of Norfolk's
Case), to lives in being plus twelve months (Lloyd v. Carew), to lives
in being plus twelve months plus the period of gestation (Long v.
Blackhall, Kings Bench 1797), to lives in being plus twenty-one years
(Cadell v. Palmer, Eng. Reprint 956). In Cadell v. Palmer the
period of twenty-one years was not considered as a term in gross
without reference to the infancy of any person who was to take
under such limitation, or any other person, born or en ventre so mere.
Having developed a crystallized rule, the courts refused to extend the
time beyond lives in being (plus twenty-one years) plus the period of
gestation as a life in being.
Up to this time the question of alienability as distinguished from
the time within which the estate must vest, was not seriously considered. This was perhaps due to the facts and circumstances of the
cases presented not having called for any decision upon this point. It
seems that the predominating thought in the minds of the judges was
to set a limit upon the period of time during which a testator would
be allowed to control the vesting of his property. They endeavored
to formulate a rule to bring the time for vesting out of the future
and up as far as possible to the present. However, it cannot be said
that the question of alienability never arose. The fine and common
recovery was in itself a court made rule which permitted an alienation.
It was also brought up in the case of Pells v. Brown where the court
mentioned that "there was no mischievous perpetuity since the contingent remainderman could join in the recovery." This of course
would destroy any suspension of alienation. Yet we are struck with
the force of Lord Nottingham's words in the case of the Duke of
Norfolk when he says: "Such (estates) do fight against God, for
they pretend to such a stability in human affairs as the nature of them
admits not of, and they are against the reason and policy of the law,
and therefore not to be endured." It is evident that the Lord Chancellor was referring to the postponement of the time within which
the estate should vest. From the language of the courts in the line
of cases building up the rule, it may be gathered that the uppermost
thought was that of a limitation upon the remoteness of vesting.
In Washburn v. Downes (i Cas. ch. 213), this definition was laid
down: "A perpetuity is where, if all that have interest join, and yet
cannot pass or bar the estate, but if by the concurrence of all having
an interest, the estate tail may be barred, it is no perpetuity." The
language of the court is none too clear, but they seem to refer to the
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rule as one of alienability. In Scattergood v. Edge (20 Chan. Div.
562) it was remarked that a perpetuity existed where an estate would
be inalienable though all mankind joined in the conveyance. At any
rate the question remained open as to whether a contingent estate
which might not vest within the period of the rule, would nevertheless
be valid if it were capable of being alienated.
The case of London & South Western Railway Co. v. Gomm
settled this question in a decision handed down by the English Court
of Appeals in 1882. Certain land was conveyed by a Railway Corporation to one Powell subject to a covenant on the part of the
latter giving the corporation an option to require a reconveyance upon
certain contingencies which might not happen until after the expiration of lives in being plus twenty-one years. The defendant had
succeeded to the interests of Powell and later the Railway Company
exercised its option to require a reconveyance. The defendant contended that the covenant to reconvey was void as tending to create a
future estate in land that might not vest within the period prescribed
in the Rule against Perpetuities. The situation in this case did not
give rise to a question of alienation. The property was alienable since
the Railway Corporation could easily have joined in a conveyance and
passed full title, therefore the statement in the case of Scattergood v.
Edge would not apply to the Gomm case. The court stated that, "It
is impossible to assert as a general proposition that where the owner
of an estate and the owner of such a contingent interest can pass a
good title, the rule of perpetuities does not apply." Accordingly, after
reviewing the various authorities, the court held that the criterion of
a perpetuity was not alienability but was whether the estate must necessarily vest in interest within the period of the rule. They held the
option too remote, thereby establishing the rule of Remoteness of
Vesting which has been followed ever since in England and adopted
in the great majority of jurisdictions in America.
The Gomm case had not as yet been decided, when the New York
statutes relating to future interests in property were adopted. Consequently when the revisors sought to codify the common law upon
this subject there was, no doubt, some confusion as to what was the
true rule of perpetuities. With all due respect to the ability of the
advisers it must be conceded that they were guided by the remarks
in the decisions prior to the Gomm case, including Scattergood v.
Edge and Washburn v. Downes. As a result of the lack of clarity
in these early cases, the statutes of New York as adopted, embodied
the rule of Suspension of Alienation and failed to mention the test
of Remoteness of Vesting.
It is not questioned but that the revisors intended the statutes to be
declaratory of the common law with even further restrictions, since
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the early New York statutes cut the period of time from any number
of lives in being to two lives. Evidently the intention was to shorten
the period within which contingent estates must vest, but the result
was that, under the judicial interpretation, the door was opened wide
for the creation of future estates unlimited as to the time of vesting.
Section 230.14 of the Wisconsin statutes, which is a counterpart of
the New York statute, reads as follows:
Every future estate shall be void in its creation, which shall suspend the absolute power of alienation for a longer period than is prescribed in this chapter; such power of alienation is suspended when
there are no persons in being by whom an absolute fee in possession can
be conveyed. Limitations of future or contingent interests in personal
property are subject to the rules prescribedin relation to future estates
in real property; provided, however, that this limitation upon interests
in personalproperty shall not apply to any instrument which shall have
taken effect prior to July, 1925.

With the exception of the last sentence pertaining to personalty
this statute is similar to Section 14 of the New York Real property
act, having been adopted from the New York statutes. Section
230.15 sets the period of time at two lives in being and twenty-one
years thereafter.* The corresponding New York section provides for
a period of two lives in being, thus cutting off the twenty-one year
addition existing at common law. It will be seen from the above
statutory quotation that alienability was made the apparent criterion
of a perpetuity. The earlier New York decisions in construing this
statute interpreted it as a rule of Suspension of Alienation. In Robert
v. Corning (89 N.Y. 225) the court in its opinion stated as follows:
"The Statute of perpetuities is pointed only to the power of alienation
and not to the time of its actual exercise, and there can be no unlawful perpetuity unless the power of sale is suspended." Under this
construction the common law was changed so as to place no limit upon
the time within which a contingent future interest must vest, but so
long as the property could be aliened, it did not offend against the
statute. The following example will illustrate the difference between
* EDITOR'S NOTE:
Since the writing of the above article, section 230.15 has
been changed to read:
"The absolute power of alienation shall not be suspended by any limitation or
condition whatever for a period longer than during the continuance of a life or
lives in being at the creation of the estate, and thirty years thereafter, except
in the single case mentioned in 23o.i6, and except when real estate is given,
granted, or devised to a charitable . . . . etc.....
."
230.J6 reads: "A contingent remainder in fee may be created on a prior

remainder in fee, to take effect in the event that the persons to whom the first
remainder is limited shall die under the age of 21 years, or upon any contingency
by which the estate of such persons may be determined before they attain their
full age."
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the application of the two rules: X devises an estate to A and his
heirs, but if used for business purposes, then to B and his heirs. If
decided according to the common law, the contingent estate would be
void because the time of vesting in B and his heirs might be too
remote, but if decided according to the New York statutes, it would
be valid because there would be no suspension of the power to alienate.
A and B could get together and convey absolute title.
In Dugan v. Wade (144 N.Y. 573) the testator devised real estate
to an executor directing him to sell the same at public auction to the
highest bidder at some convenient time preferably not before the
spring of 1891. Contention was made that the clause violated the
statute of perpetuities in that it fixed a time for the sale so as to
suspend the power of alienation for a period not measured by lives.
In its opinion the court stated as follows:
The absolute power of alienation is not suspended merely because the
executor may require a period of time not measured by lives in being,
in which to execute the power of sale, thereby converting the land into
personality. That result is accomplished only where there are no persons in being by whom an absolute estate in possession can be conveyed.
This criterion of alienability was severely criticized and pressure was
brought to bear upon the unsoundness of it as a principle of the common law. The New York court began to realize that this interpretation of the statutes which opened wide the door for creation of
estates unlimited as to time of vesting, was not in conformity with
the trend of the common law. Estates were being created which tied
up property indefinitely, restricting its investment or removing it from
the paths of commerce entirely. The inevitable consequences were
foreseen with the result that the court was constrained to establish a
different interpretation of the statute governing perpetuities.
In Allen v. Allen (149 N.Y. 280) the court by way of dicta said,
"The power to sell and reinvest does not save a trust from the condemnation of the statutes." Evidently the court had in mind that there
must be a power given to terminate a trust entirely, in order to be
valid under the statute. The criterion of alienability established by
the New York statutes was attacked by Professor Gray of Harvard
in his work on the Rule against Perpetuities. There is little doubt
but that in a large measure it was due to Professor Gray's teaching
and his labors on the subject of perpetuities that sufficient pressure
was finally brought to bear by men sent out from Harvard with convictions opposed to the criterion of alienability, to expose the unsoundness of that criterion as a fundamental proposition of the common law.
Up until 19o9, the criterion of alienability appeared to be quite
firmly established by judicial decision in New York, when the case

PERPETUITIPS UNDER NEW AMENDMEiT

of Matter of Wilcox came before the court. The testator, Bethuel
McCoy, in his will provided among other things:
That one third of the residue of my property both real and personal
be held in trust for the benefit of my daughter, Frances Wilcox, for
life and at her death I devise and bequeath to her issue such income,
and as each of said issue reach the age of twenty-one years, I give
devise and bequeath to it, one equal share of the principal of said onethird. In case my daughter die leaving no issue, which shall attain the
age of twenty-one years, then said remaining one third of my estate,
I devise and bequeath to my daughter, Maria E. Sanders and my son
Charles McCoy, share and share alike forever.
Charles McCoy and Frank McCoy, children of the testator's son William, contended that this clause was invalid because it might suspend
the absolute ownership of personal property during lives not in being
at the death of the testator. It was also contended even if the provision for the issue of Frances was invalid, yet it did not affect the
validity of the gift over. The court in its opinion stated: "For a
contingent limitation of a remainder in personal property to be valid,
the contingency must be such as to necessarily occur within two lives
in being at the death of the testator. The limitation to take effect on
the death of all issue of Frances is void." The court thereby rejected
the criterion of alienability, thus overruling all prior decisions to the
contrary, and held that since the interest, even though alienable, would
not necessarily vest within the period of that statute, the estate sought
to be created was void for remoteness. The sections of the New
York statutes following section 14 and 15 were brought into issue
by the court. Section 24, upon which their decision seems to be based,
reads as follows:
Subject to the rules established in the preceding sections of this
article, a freehold estate as well as a chattel real, may be created to
commence at a future day; an estate for life may be created in a term
of years, and a remainder limited thereon; a remainder of a freehold or
a chattel real, either contingent or vested, may be created expectant on
the determination of a term of years; and a fee may be limited on a
fee, upon a contingency, which, if it should occur, must happen within
the period prescribed in this article.
The court held that this section was declaratory of the common law
rule against remoteness of vesting. They questioned the assertion
in former cases that.there was only one rule against perpetuities in
New York which was the suspension of alienation rule. The court
asked why these elaborate and minutely detailed provisions followed
sections 14 and 15, if the devisors did not intend that the rule of
Remoteness of Vesting be established in conformity with the common law. The revisors, being familiar with the common law, it is
evident that they intended the statute to be declaratory of the common
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law with a further limitation. They certainly did not intend to remove
all restrictions, thereby making possible the creation of estates unlimited as to the time of vesting. The tendency was to shorten the
time and this is borne out by their cutting off the twenty-one year
period of the common law rule. It must be admitted that the judicial reasoning was somewhat strained in order to bring about the
results of the Matter of Wilcox decision. It is asserted by some
authorities that there are now two rules in New York. The first that
of suspension of alienation, laid down by sections 14 and 15 of the
statutes, while the second is that of remoteness of vesting, laid down
by section 24 of the New York statutes. Still other authorities including Professor Rundell of Wisconsin maintain that since the statutes were intended to be declaratory of the common law, the sections,
as a whole, lay down a rule of remoteness only. Had this view been
adopted in the earlier New York cases, it would have avoided the
strained construction of the statutes necessary to accomplish the
desired result in the Matter of Wilcox. The Rule of Remoteness of
Vesting laid down by the Wilcox case has since been upheld in New
York in Walker v. Otisco Lake Railway Co. (226 N.Y. 347).
The situation in Wisconsin is somewhat analogous to that in New
York since the Wisconsin statutes have been adopted from New
York and Wisconsin courts have to some extent followed New York
decisions. Wisconsin is now facing the same problem that confronted
the New York courts before the decision of the Matter of Wilcox.
A way is being sought either through the legislature or a decision of
the Supreme Court, whereby the law upon this subject may be clearly
defined. Since the Matter of Wilcox decision, coupled with the passing of the recent amendment, a way has been opened which may lead
to a solution of the problem. However there are some obstacles to
be overcome before that decision can be adopted by the Wisconsin
court.
The Wisconsin statute 230.24, corresponding to section 24 of the
New York statutes, is not as inclusive as the New York section. Section 230.24 reads as follows: "Subject to the rules established in
the preceding sections of this chapter, a freehold estate, as well as
a chattel real, may be created to commence at a future day; an estate
for life may be created in a term of years and a remainder limited
thereon." It will be noted that the provision of the New York statute, section 24, stating that "a fee may be limited on a fee, upon
a contingency which, if it should occur, must happen within the period
prescribed in this article," is not included in the Wisconsin section.
Section 24 having been the "ratio decidendi" for the Matter of Wilcox,
the Wisconsin court, if a case is presented calling for a test of remoteness, may not feel inclined to follow that decision, in view of the
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modification of our own statute. The New York court followed the
Gomm case, which case found no support in Wisconsin in the decision
of Becker v. Chester. This leaves the principle of remoteness of
vesting either covered by section 230.24 or else not at all included
in the Wisconsin code. If it is not included in th6 code, then the
common law ought to be in force. The Wisconsin decisions have left
this question in a state of much confusion. In Dodge v. Williams
(46 Wis. 70) Chief Justice Ryan in the course of his opinion remarked
that "The statute limiting the rule against perpetuities to realty, manifestly abrogates the English doctrine as applicable to personalty."
"Expressio unius, exclusio alterius." The Wisconsin statute, now
230.14, at that time referred only to realty and Chief Justice Ryan
reasoned that since the statute expressly adopted one portion of the
common law, that the remaining portion was rejected. But what
should be said of the constitutional provision that the common law
in this state is in force unless expressly suspended by statute. The
statute had not as yet spoken as regards personalty, therefore the
common law should have been in force in the absence of any express
abrogations. This remark of the Chief Justice was unnecessary to the
decision of that case and its accuracy was also questioned in the case
of De Wolf v. Lowson (61 Wis. 469) and Harrington v. Pier (105
Wis. 493) as being merely obiter dictum.
Later in the case of Becker v. Chester (115 Wis. 9o), which involved the validity of a trust of personal property that was to continue during the lives of certain persons named therein, plus a gross
term of twenty-one years, the court held that under the common law
this limitation did not violate the Rule against Perpetuities, inasmuch
as the vesting of the future estate was postponed no longer than
until the expiration of lives in being plus the gross term of twentyone years. The court followed Cadell v. Palmer. The important issue
of the case was that of equitable conversion, however Justice Marshall
took up the remark made in Dodge v. Williams and also concluded that
the rule against perpetuities was not applicable to personalty in Wisconsin. This conclusion was not necessary in deciding the case and
may not have been approved by the court as a sound principle of law
because Justice Marshall later in his opinion remarked: "In states
havng a statutory situation similar to ours, it has been held that the
common law is in force. It is by no means improbable that were we
permitted to deal with the subject as an original matter that we would
so hold." Chief Justice Cassoday dissented from the holding that
the common law rule was not in force in Wisconsin in regard to personalty, in an able opinion concluding with the following remark:
While I have no doubt that my brothern have made the ruling here
complained of, in pursuance of a sense of duty, nevertheless I have
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been constrained to write this separate opinion, in which I have attempted in a respectful manner, to expose what I regard as a legal
monstrosity, in the hope that the legislature may do something to relieve
the state of Wisconsin from being the only state in the Union where
personal property may be given in trust for a private purpose and rendered inalienable for all time.
Justice Cassoday's convictions finally found the support of other
men of foresight, with the result that section 230.14 was amended so
as to include personal property, making personalty subject to the
same rules of restraint as realty.
Whatever may be its final effect, it is now certain that since the
legislature has spoken, there remains but one rule in Wisconsin governing both real and personal property. This puts an end to much of
the discussion that featured the cases involving perpetuities, but
whether it will accomplish the desired result is still another question.
It is contended that even though the rule of suspension of alienation
applies now to personalty, yet, in the matter of trusts where the
trustee has the power or is even obligated to sell and invest the funds
of a trust, there is no unlawful suspension, since there is always
someone in being who can alienate the property.
Whether a trust estate continuing for more than two lives in being
and twenty-one years, giving to the trustees the power to alienate
will be valid, is yet to be seen. And again if the power to terminate
the entire trust at any time they see fit, were vested in the trustees,
and this trust should extend beyond the period of the rule, would the
courts hold that such a trust estate is valid? These are questions
that must now be determined. Some authorities maintain that under
the new amendment, suspension of alienation means suspension of
the power to terminate the trust, in other words to remove the corpus
of the estate from the fetters of the trust. This is but another way
of expressing the Remoteness of Vesting rule.
The Will of Hamburger (185 Wis. 270) is the latest Wisconsin decision regarding alienation of trust property. In that case the First
Wisconsin Trust Company held 23,000 shares of Gimbel Brothers'
stock in trust for the wife of testator Nathan Hamburger, Sr. "subject
only to this bequest in trust for and during the life of my said wife,
the principal of this bequest is given, devised and bequeathed to my
wife to become her sole and separate estate, to be disposed of by her
by will or otherwise; and if she does not dispose of it, to become
upon her death, a part of her intestate estate." The wife attempted
to transfer iooo shares to her son who was in the employ of Gimbel
Brothers Corporation. The trust company refused to transfer and
appealed from an order to transfer. The Supreme Court held that
the beneficiary of a trust in personalty could not terminate the trust
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in the absence of express power to so terminate it. The cardinal rule
laid down by the court is to find out the intention of the testator and
to give it effect. Thus we find a court made rule governing the
alienation of the corpus of a trust in personalty by a beneficiary, conforming to the statutory rule in New York. This decision settled
the question of beneficiaries terminating the trust estate in the absence
of express power in the instrument creating it.
There remains the situation where, if no power is given to a trustee
to terminate the trust within the statutory period, but only to invest,
will the trust be void for suspension?
The rule is statutory in New York that neither trustee nor beneficiary can terminate a trust estate without an express power. It is
quite probable that in view of the late Wisconsin decisions and the
Matter of Wilcox in New York, coupled with the passing of the
amendment, the Wisconsin court will be constrained to follow the
New York decision, which in turn followed London & South Western
Railway v. Go mm, and thereby re-establish the common law rule
regarding perpetuities in Wisconsin.
In Becker v. Chester, Justice Marshall, speaking of the remark of
Chief Justice Ryan in Dodge v. Williams to the effect that the common law was abrogated, said: "It has stood as so established, though
somewhat clouded, it is true, by intimations indicating that the way
was open for reconsideration, without change for twenty-three yearslong enough to be regarded as a rule of property and safe from danger
of change except by legislative enactment. Stare decisis et non quieta
nmovere, should be regarded as the governing principle."
Now that this change has been accomplished by the legislature, it is
hoped that the dicta in these former cases may be cleared up and a
decision made, declaratory of the common law and bringing into effect
the Rule of Remoteness of Vesting.

